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methodology proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005), with the 
purpose of identifying the most binding constraints for economic growth and the 
policies that, if implemented, can have the largest positive impact. To rank public 
policy priorities the HRV (2005) methodological approach is complemented with 
an econometric analysis of micro-data, aimed at exploring the impact that the 
various potential constraints to growth have had on firm-level investment 
decisions. The data shows economic reactivation in areas with falling violence. 
Results from analysis at the microeconomic level, however, give a particular spin 
to this conclusion by showing that investment decisions at the firm level are also 
explained by the restoration of some form of public order connected to the 
cessation of paramilitary violence and not only by the reduction of violence. 
From a public policy perspective, perhaps the most relevant result is the 
confirmation that in Colombia investment decisions are negatively affected by the 
cost of financing. Empirical results, robust across model specifications, single out 
the provision of access to financing at fair prices as a policy priority for economic 
growth, relevant across country regions and independent of whether uncertainties 
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1.  Introduction 
While economic growth in Colombia has been widely diagnosed
3
2.  Stylized facts 
, there are two areas in which 
there is still space for contribution. One is the ranking of policy priorities for economic growth. 
The other is the analysis of the incentives for investment at the microeconomic level and of the 
distortions that result from government or market failures. Progress in these directions is crucial 
for adequate policy design and is not independent. This paper contributes to fill these gaps 
In the framework given by the IADB, this paper revisits economic growth in Colombia using the 
growth diagnostics methodology proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) – 
henceforth HRV (2005) –  with the purpose of identifying the most binding constraints for 
economic growth and the policies that, if implemented, can have the largest positive impact. In 
the context of the growth diagnostics decision tree proposed by these authors, the branch that is 
left uncrossed is that of poor appropriability due to micro risks from government failures: 
uncertainty from three sources of poor property rights –public order, changing taxes and 
anticompetitive behaviors–  is found to be the most important determinant of investment 
decisions in Colombia.  
To rank public policy priorities the HRV (2005) methodological approach is complemented with 
an econometric analysis of micro-data, aimed at exploring the impact that the various potential 
constraints to growth have had on firm-level investment decisions. Most findings are confirmed.  
To no surprise, the data shows economic reactivation in areas with falling violence. Results from 
analysis at the microeconomic level, however, give a particular spin to this conclusion by 
showing that investment decisions at the firm level are also explained by the restoration of some 
form of public order connected to the cessation of paramilitary violence and not exclusively by 
the reduction of violence per se.  
From a public policy perspective, perhaps the most relevant result is the confirmation that in 
Colombia investment decisions are negatively affected by the costs of financing. Empirical 
results, robust across model specifications, single out the provision of access to financing at fair 
prices as a policy priority for economic growth, relevant across country regions and independent 
of whether uncertainties from poor protection to property rights are resolved. 
The paper is organized as follows. As a motivation for a growth diagnostics exercise, following 
this introduction, Section 2 presents an overview of the stylized facts of economic growth in 
Colombia. Section 3 contains a growth diagnostics analysis strictly based on the HRV (2005) 
strategy for identifying the policy priorities that is used to arrive at a set of hypotheses. These 
hypotheses are then empirically tested in the following section using micro-data, and conclusions 
and policy recommendation follow. 
Figure 1 summarizes well the history of economic growth in Colombia since 1970. GDP per 
capita grew at 3% per year on average in the 1970s and then at 2.2% between 1985 and 1997, but 
                                                 
3 The most recent research on this topic is found in GRECO (2002) and Cárdenas (2005).   6 
completely stagnated during the first half of the 1980s and decreased at a rate of -1.3% per year 
between 1997 and 2002. The positive results of 2004 and 2005 have partially compensated this 
poor performance and GDP per capita has grown on average at a rate of 2.9% in the last three 
years
4
Figure 1: Economic growth, 1970-2005 (1970=1) 
. This is, however, not yet enough to put the country back on the growth path on which it 
was in the 1970s. GDP per capita would have to grow at the 3.6% rate of 2005 during fourteen 
years in order to reach the level it would have had, had it kept growing at the average rate of the 

















































































GDP per worker GDP per capita  
Source: DANE and GRECO (2002). 
 
The picture is even less appealing if you look at the evolution of GDP per worker that had its 
peak in 1995, then dropped continuously until 2003 when it reached a level close to that of 1970, 
and despite recovery in the recent years had not reached by the end of 2005 its level of 1980.  
So while Colombia’s economy has grown with few reversion episodes it has experienced periods 
of deceleration and the recession of the end of the century was strong enough to erode the gains 
of the previous years, causing the decade between 1994 and 2004 to be lost in terms of economic 
growth.  
Between 1970 and 2005 the less dynamic sectors were Agriculture –with very poor performance 
since 1990– and Manufacturing that grew at 6.8% per year in the 1970s and at 2.8% between 
1985 and 1997 but stagnated between 1980 and 1995 and grew at only 1.4% between 1997 and 
2002, systematically losing participation over total GDP. Manufacturing growth recovery 
between 2002 and 2005 basically reflects this sector’s good performance in 2005. In contrast, 
Mining and quarrying experienced substantial expansion during the 1980s and 1990s, largely 
driven by performance of coal, ferronickel and oil. The same is true for the Services sectors 
between 1985 and 1997. 
                                                 
4 Official GDP figures for 2006 are not yet available but will add to the positive trend.   7 
Breaking GDP growth by demand components shows that the recession of the end of the century 
was preceded by substantial acceleration of public consumption (from average growth rates of 
6% in the 1970s to average growth rates of 9% between 1985 and 1997)
5
 
, and accompanied by 
deceleration of public investment (from positive average growth rates of 6% in the 1970s and of 
10% between 1985 and 1997, to negative average growth rates of -1% between 1997 and 2002) 
and by a sizeable decline of private investment (from positive average growth rates of 7% in the 
1970s, and 3% between 1980 and 1997, to negative average growth rates of -7% between 1997 
and 2002). Positive average growth between 2002 and 2005 is associated with the recovery of 
private investment. 
 







































































































Investment / GDP Trend
 
Source: DANE and Fedesarrollo. 
Figure 2 shows that investment as a share of GDP had a peak in 1961 and then entered a 
declining path. This tendency reverted between 1993 and 1995, when it recovered to levels 
similar to those of the early 1960s, but the performance of those years was not sustained and 
investment fell again experiencing the largest drop between 1998 and 1999, when it dipped to 
less than 13% of GDP. Recovery since then has been continuous and has occurred at a sustained 
pace since 2003.  
Between 1994 and 1997, public investment was substituted by private investment. These are 
years of privatization of public utilities and transport infrastructure concessions. In 1998 the drop 
of private investment was partially compensated by an increase in public investment, which was 
only an interruption of the declining path in which public investment had entered. Private 
investment continued to decline until 2000 and started to recover at a good pace since 2001. 
While the recent performance of private investment and economic growth justifies optimism, 
there are at least two issues that call for a more cautious assessment. First, the economy is not yet 
on the growth path on which it was in the 1970s, and has shown growth recovery only for three 
                                                 
5 As a result of which public consumption as a share of GDP went from 11.5% to 21.9% between 1990 and 2000.   8 
years in a row in a context of favorable international conditions. So there is the question of 
whether growth can be sustained overtime at the current rates even if the favorable international 
conditions were to change. This is inherently connected to whether the increasing investment 
materializes in productivity growth or not, because ultimately it is through its impact on 
productivity that investment can give way to sustained growth in the medium and long run. 
In fact, poor performance of productivity has been associated with the slowdown of economic 
growth in Colombia. Cárdenas (2005) decomposes the growth of GDP per worker for Colombia 
between 1965 and 2004 into changes in physical capital accumulation, growth of human capital 
per worker and productivity growth, and finds that while between 1970 and 2004 the average 
increase in years of education positively contributed to raising output per worker, and physical 
capital accumulation also contributed positively to output growth since 1980, in the recent years 
this did not materialize in higher growth due to the contraction of total factor productivity. 
Estimations of the aggregate production function for the Colombian economy by the same author 
confirm the finding of a decreasing residual. While this type of measurement is broad and may 
be capturing the evolution of productivity along with other things, the concern it raises about 
productivity performance in Colombia is justified. Evidence from the evolution of manufacturing 
productivity estimated at the firm level show TFP stagnating between 1980 and 1999 and 
increasing only in 1999 apparently as a result of the exit of the less productive plants during the 
recession (Meléndez et al., 2006). Investigating if there has been a permanent change in the 
business environment to provide the appropriate incentives for productivity-enhancing 
investments seems critical. 
Gross capital formation recovery since 2002 is largely explained by the performance of housing 
construction, hardly associated with productivity growth. 
Second, growth is not yet a widespread phenomenon across the country’s regions. While average 
growth rates after 2002 show in most cases recovery from the previous years, there are still a 
number of departments experiencing negative growth or stagnation. The cases of Norte de 
Santander, Quindío, Putumayo, Guainía, Guaviare, Vaupés and Casanare are noteworthy because 
in these departments GDP per capita continued to decline after 2002 at significant rates. Also 
notable are the cases of recovery at average rates above 4% (against a national average annual 
growth of 2.8%) for departments in the Atlantic region (Cesar, Córdoba, Sucre, La Guajira), 
Cauca, Chocó, Santander, Risaralda and Vichada. Understanding the origin of these different 
performances is necessary to learn if Colombia has overcome the constraints to growth that were 
binding in previous years and will continue to grow in a sustainable manner, or if the path to 
growth is still fragile.  
 
Performances of La Guajira, Cesar, and Chocó, for instance, can be explained to varying degrees 
by the positive performance of the mining sector. Recalculation of GDP per capita growth 
without mining, results in average rates of, respectively, -39.7%, 2.1% and 3.4% for these 
departments between 2002 and 2005.  
As will be shown, departments with performances at the extremes of the distribution have also 
been at the center of attention regarding the violent conflict in which Colombia is immersed 
because of either the presence of cocaine crops under fumigation (negative performances), or   9 
relocated cocaine crops and/or paramilitary presence (positive performances). So exploring in 
more detail the role of the conflict in its multiple expressions in the shaping of the Colombian 
economy seems critical for adequate policy design. 
At the outset, it seems justified to believe that in Colombia the most binding constraints and 
policy priorities for economic growth are not necessarily the same across regions, and 
particularly that policy priorities for promoting growth in the rural areas may be second order 
priorities in the more developed urban Colombia. 
 
3.  Growth diagnostics exercise 
HRV (2005) propose a methodology to identify the most binding constraints for economic 
growth that rests on the consideration of possible explanations for insufficient investment. Their 
framework suggests reviewing the factors that can affect investment decisions, to identify and 
rank the areas that are problematic in order to bring them to the attention of policy makers. 
Potential areas of constrain are organized under two broad categories: factors that result in high 
costs of finance, and factors that result in low returns to investment. This section explores each 
of the branches of the HRV (2005) growth diagnostics tree in the case of Colombia and 
investigates which constraints are more binding according to the available evidence.  
The analysis largely focuses on understanding what has been different in the periods of positive 
economic growth and the periods of growth stagnation or deceleration, whether the constraints to 
growth that were binding during the growth reversal of the late 1990s have in fact been removed, 
and what are the constraints that policy makers will have to tackle next in order to ensure 
sustained growth at the rates of the last three years. 
a.  High cost of finance 
Recent growth in Colombia has been paired with falling interest rates and a steady interest rate 
spread (see Table 1). For high cost of finance to qualify as a binding constraint for growth 
according to the HRV (2005) methodology, however, it should be true that higher interest rates 
in Colombia have been associated with periods of lower growth and higher spreads. But interest 
rates were higher during the years of positive growth between 1986 and 1997, when the economy 
was also growing, and the spread was also higher.  
 
Table 1: Interest rates, 1986-2004 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Nominal 40.8 41.1 42.7 43.0 45.2 47.1 37.3 35.8 40.5 42.7 42.0 34.2 42.2 25.8 18.8 20.7 16.3 15.2 15.1 14.6 12.9
Real 16.4 13.8 11.4 13.4 9.7 16.0 9.7 10.8 14.6 19.5 16.7 14.1 21.9 15.1 9.2 12.1 8.7 8.2 9.1 9.3 8.4
Nominal 31.4 30.8 33.5 33.7 36.4 37.2 26.7 25.8 29.4 32.3 31.2 24.1 32.6 21.3 12.1 12.4 8.9 7.8 7.8 7.0 6.3
Real 8.6 5.5 4.2 6.0 3.1 8.2 1.2 2.6 5.6 10.8 7.8 5.5 13.6 11.1 3.1 4.5 1.8 1.2 2.2 2.1 1.8
Lending rate
Deposit rate  
Source: IFS and calculations by the authors. 
Because despite the recent evolution of interest rates, and despite the fact that making a case that 
poor access to financing is a binding constraint for growth is not straightforward from just 
looking at the evolution of prices, this section presents other evidence to show that it may still be 
a concern. A first piece of evidence is the cross-country comparison of interest rate spreads,   10 
where Colombia falls right on the Latin American average, but looks much worse against 
economies that have been recently growing at faster rates. 
i.  Bad local finance 
Poor intermediation: In spite of having experienced significant growth over the last 15 years, the 
Colombian financial sector is still small and shallow. Both the Colombian banking and non-
banking financial sectors are relatively small. The picture is slightly different for the corporate 
debt market, in which Colombia appears as a medium size player; but this is a market still 
concentrated on a small number of issuers and issues, and relatively illiquid. 
In Colombia firms largely finance their activity through retained earnings or other own resources 
financing through the market is still limited to firms able to issue large amounts of debt, and 
banking credit to the private sector is also largely restricted to larger firms. Financing from the 
banking sector is also concentrated in the larger firms, both by number of loans and value 
(Aguilar et al. 2006). 
Also, a large share of market liquidity has been -an continues to be- absorbed by the public 
sector. The increasing financing needs of the government between 1990 and 2004 resulted in 
impressive growth of the public component of the Colombian debt market -the share of Treasury 
bonds rose from 13% to 57% as a share of total public debt over these years and from 8% to 23% 
of GDP between 1997 and 2004. Treasury bonds placed in the market at interest rates higher 
than competing investments, have resulted in large shares of financial institutions’ portfolios 
invested in public debt. In 2004, banks had on average 64% of their portfolios invested in 
Treasury bonds. Aguilar et al (2006) find evidence of crowding-out of financial resources against 
private investors. 
Low savings: The average savings rate was highest between 1985 and 1997 (24%), dropped to 
14% between 1998 and 2002, and despite recovery in recent years is still below its average level 
during the years of stagnation between 1980 and 1985. This evolution of the savings rate 
suggests  that in Colombia periods of stagnation or deceleration have been preceded by 
deterioration of the savings rate, while periods of good performance have been preceded by 
increases in savings. There still remains the question of whether savings measured as gross 
income minus consumption is a good measure of true savings in a context of under reported 
capital outflows.  
When broken by origin, the contribution of the government to the savings rate is systematically 
lower than that of the private sector and extremely low or negative between 1997 and 2002. 
Evaluation: poor access to financing due to bad local finance has been a constraint for growth in 
Colombia in the past. The crisis of 1999 was largely driven by a shortage of market liquidity for 
the private sector induced at least in part by the government through the placement of large 
amounts of domestic public debt in the market, required to finance increasing public 
expenditures associated with new obligations from the Constitution of 1991 as well as with war 
expenses. The lack of financing was critical due to the low availability of private savings and the 
fact that only few had access to alternative sources of funding. While in 2005 and 2006 the 
economy appears to finally be on a recovery path, most of the signs that access to financing can 
be a constraint for sustainable growth are still present.   11 
ii.  Bad international finance 
With respect to external financing, the Colombian government has uninterruptedly had access to 
foreign financing. Moreover, despite having lost the investment grade after 1999, the evolution 
of foreign public debt shows an increasing reliance on market-based instruments. Foreign debt 
bonds increased from 2,2% in 1990 to 22,3% in 2004 as a share of total debt, gaining 
participation against loans from agencies, governments, multilateral organizations and 
commercial banks. Firm access to foreign financing has been more rare and restricted to larger 
firms. The evolution of private sector external debt shows, however, that external markets have 
been a financing alternative for those who have access to them. 
Colombia’s ability to attract foreign direct investment has been, however, apparently 
compromised by the difficulty to guarantee property rights in the context of the conflict. While 
throughout  the 1980s the country experienced substantial growth of FDI inflows, and 
liberalization of its FDI regime in 1991 paired with privatization and fiscal and foreign exchange 
reforms resulted in positive growth rates in the 1990s, Colombia’s FDI performance has 
remained below the regional average both on a per capita basis and in relation to the size of the 
economy. Peaks of performance are explained by privatizations of public services that occurred 
in the second half of the 1990s and by the sale of Bavaria to SABMiller that accounted for $5.5 
billion in 2005. Only the mining sector shows a sustained positive trend in recent years.  
Finally, Colombia’s imports more than it exports. The foreign trade balance was not a source of 
savings during the 1990s, and it has not been a source of savings in the recent years of positive 
growth either. 
Evaluation: poor access to financing due to bad international finance is not a binding constraint 
for growth in the case of Colombia. 
b.  Low returns to economic activity – low appropriability 
i.   Government failures – micro risks 
Protection to property rights
 
: This is an area in which Colombia fares poorly. The government’s 
inability to protect investors from the lack of security from the on-going armed conflict is a 
major source of poor appropriability of returns, and while it is likely to impact economic activity 
in rural areas more strongly, it affects incentives for investment in general. It deters investments 
that would otherwise have taken place, it diverts investment towards activities that would not 
have been investors’ first choices during peace times but are for safety reasons more convenient 
due to lower potential losses (i.e. projects with lower fixed costs or shorter time-frames for 
investment recovery), it distorts location choices to favor the safer areas, and it raises production 
costs for investors who incur in non-productive expenses to guarantee their safety to operate. 
These expenses may be legal (such as expenses on guards, alarm systems, etc.) or illegal (such as 
side-payments to the paramilitary or the guerrilla), and are likely correlated with location 
choices.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of violence in Colombia since 1970. It was in the second half of the 
1980s that violence from the cocaine business started to be felt more strongly, and in the 1990s, 
when the guerrilla became more involved in cocaine, that violence hiked. Recovery in recent   12 
years is associated to a decrease in kidnappings and massacres that chronologically coincides 
with the enactment of the Law of Security and Order under Alvaro Uribe’s presidency. 
Figure 4 presents evidence of the recent evolution of the conflict’s violence by types of event - 
the kidnappings series cleaned to reflect only events for which the paramilitary or guerrilla have 
been identified as responsible. The increase in recorded armed contact events since 2002 is 
noteworthy and reflects the on-going war. 
The fact that at the regional level in recent years the picture in terms of both economic 
performance and conflict evolution is mixed, allows us to gauge the role of property rights 
protection as driver of investment and of its absence as a binding constraint for growth in some 
of the regions of Colombia.  
 













































































































Homicide rate Victims Massacres Kidnappings rate  
Source: National Police. 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Terrorist attack Assault to population Attack to infrastructure
Armed contact Ambush Harassment
Land piracy Kidnapping
 
Source: Observatory of Human Rights, Vice-Presidency of Colombia and calculations by the authors. 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of violent events across regions ranked by the total number of 
violent events recorded between 1998 and 2006
6
Table 2: Regional distribution of violence (%)* 
. Antioquia, Santander and Cesar stand out for 
their decreasing shares. It is difficult not to associate this to their recent positive economic 
performances.  
DEPARTMENT 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ANTIOQUIA 22.1 19.1 18.4 17.8 16.8 16.7 17.6 13.5 14.0
CESAR 6.5 6.7 8.6 5.8 5.7 7.9 6.8 5.4 3.2
META 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.3 6.3 5.8 6.6 8.8
VALLE 5.8 4.9 5.8 7.3 4.9 4.0 4.8 4.6 6.9
SANTANDER 8.9 8.5 6.9 6.2 5.8 3.4 3.4 2.6 2.5
NORTE SANTANDER 5.6 7.2 6.1 6.8 4.2 4.2 2.4 3.6 4.6
ARAUCA 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.8 3.5 5.0 3.8 5.0 3.0
CAUCA 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.1 3.5 4.2 4.1 6.2 5.8
CUNDINAMARCA 2.5 2.6 3.8 4.1 6.5 6.7 4.3 2.9 0.9
TOLIMA 3.6 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 5.5
BOLIVAR 3.1 5.5 3.7 3.1 4.6 3.6 3.2 2.5 3.5
CAQUETA 2.0 1.7 2.5 2.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.7 4.2
MAGDALENA 3.2 2.4 3.7 3.6 3.4 2.4 4.3 3.3 2.4
NARI„O 1.6 2.8 2.2 1.5 3.4 2.7 3.1 4.8 5.1
OTHER 23.5 22.1 22.5 25.1 25.0 24.2 27.5 30.7 29.5  
Source: Observatory of Human Rights, Vice-Presidency of Colombia and calculations by the authors. * Departments ranked by number of events 
between 1998 and 2006. Includes kidnappings. 
 
Empirically, however, the analysis is complicated. First, the impact of the conflict in all of its 
expressions is not necessarily well captured by the statistics of violence. Violence is highest in 
                                                 
6 The database made available for this study by the Observatory of Human Rights of the Vice-presidency of Colombia, contains a record of all 
violent events registered by municipality, by actor. We are processing the data for years previous to 1996 (all events except kidnappings) and 
1998 (kidnappings) to be able to exploit is together with our firm-level data (1995-2005).     14 
regions in dispute, but when the dispute is resolved because one of the parties takes over, 
violence is no longer a good proxy of guerrilla or paramilitary presence. As a consequence the 
falling records of violence in some of the regions of Colombia do not necessarily imply the 
reestablishment of civil order, but rather result from the imposition of a new order under the rule 
of the paramilitary or guerrilla, that may as well bring about an alternative system of protection 
for investors’ property rights.  
Second, the logic of the conflict’s geographic distribution has two underlying forces: the 
geographic allocation of the cocaine business (reallocating to the south towards Cauca and 
Nariño in response to government action under Plan Colombia) and the geographic allocation of 
other sources of rent, such as national government transfers to local governments, or regalías 
from mining in the mining regions. When considering the relationship between armed conflict 
and economic growth, this can result in potential endogeneity since armed groups tend to locate 
in areas where economic activity is flourishing. 
Rent-seeking behavior has also materialized in capture of local governments and public sector 
decentralized expenditures by illegal groups, as well as of political actors at the national level, in 
many cases resulting in corruption of the policy-making processes and emergence of low quality 
policies aimed at the protection of individual interests. Not surprisingly, in the Global 
Competitiveness Report of 2006-07 Colombia is ranked in place 111 among 125 countries with 
respect to the security component of the Political Institutions quality index, in place 92 with 
respect to the ethics and corruption component, and in place 78 with respect to the overall public 
institutions quality measure, which are by no means independent of the cocaine business and the 
ongoing armed conflict. 
The evolution of investment by region is probably the best measure of the conflict’s impact on 
private incentives. While there are no official statistics, the firm-level data available from 
Superintendencia de Sociedades, containing records of all large and medium size firms in 
Colombia provides a good approximation to the evolution of capital expenditures
7 Table  3 .   
shows a private sector in recovery for two consecutive years, after a period of decline between 
1999 and 2003 during which investment in plant and equipment stagnated (falling 6.9% per year 
on average at book value), the hike in violence of 2002 coinciding with large-scale 
disinvestment. It also shows Antioquia, the department that has been hit by the largest share of 
violence from the armed conflict, as one of the biggest losers of the period, with a stagnant 
capital stock (falling at book value at an average annual rate of -6.2%) compared to a country 
average of 1.2%. 
While it seems natural to expect the ongoing war to reflect on economic activity, not much has 
been said about the route through which this actually happens, or about the extent of the costs it 
imposes. This look at private investment in fixed capital suggests this to be a key transmission 




                                                 
7 The data systematically includes all firms reporting assets or income equal to or higher than 20,000 minimum wages. Exit may reflect falling 
under this threshold and not necessarily closing down operations. Firms reporting decreases of plant and equipment at rates greater than -10% 
after a year of positive investment at a rate greater than 50% were dropped from the sample. 
8 These are the data used in the econometric analyses of Section 4.   15 
Table 3: Plant and equipment, by department 
In 2005 million dollars 
Department 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
5,122.10 6,523.01 7,311.03 7,573.70 7,529.92 6,610.57 7,092.14 6,304.12 6,260.34 6,479.24 6,479.24
27.4 12.1 3.6 -0.6 -12.2 7.3 -11.1 -0.7 3.5 0.0
1730 1699 1702 1643 1564 1531 1523 1427 1450 1458 1729
2,709.90 2,841.23 2,867.50 3,068.88 3,195.84 2,941.92 2,981.32 1,125.11 1,212.67 1,374.65 1,422.81
4.8 0.9 7.0 4.1 -7.9 1.3 -62.3 7.8 13.4 3.5
491 454 476 479 461 470 474 435 456 484 611
1,348.38 1,536.63 1,584.79 1,667.97 1,720.50 1,663.59 1,996.31 1,484.10 1,440.32 1,532.25 1,628.56
14.0 3.1 5.2 3.1 -3.3 20.0 -25.7 -2.9 6.4 6.3
439 414 430 426 405 407 402 385 373 376 454
547.23 726.73 739.86 779.26 770.50 709.21 717.97 577.88 604.14 608.52 674.19
32.8 1.8 5.3 -1.1 -8.0 1.2 -19.5 4.5 0.7 10.8
145 157 164 163 139 142 139 129 140 146 186
363.80 564.74 630.41 647.92 656.68 634.79 617.28 577.88 555.99 520.97 520.97
55.2 11.6 2.8 1.4 -3.3 -2.8 -6.4 -3.8 -6.3 0.0
85 92 94 97 98 94 94 91 96 99 114
114.26 128.27 175.99 184.31 227.65 253.92 217.58 147.97 207.07 390.07 630.41
12.3 37.2 4.7 23.5 11.5 -14.3 -32.0 39.9 88.4 61.6
7 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 10
277.12 282.37 221.08 216.27 216.27 208.39 210.14 182.12 167.23 211.01 226.77
1.9 -21.7 -2.2 0.0 -3.6 0.8 -13.3 -8.2 26.2 7.5
72 66 63 69 60 60 63 60 58 64 78
8.54 14.10 69.17 122.14 149.72 253.92 318.27 300.32 301.63 311.70 323.09
65.1 390.7 76.6 22.6 69.6 25.3 -5.6 0.4 3.3 3.7
7 7 17 26 29 40 43 43 44 45 52
213.64 265.30 270.55 349.35 365.55 327.90 62.17 59.10 59.98 39.05 49.47
24.2 2.0 29.1 4.6 -10.3 -81.0 -4.9 1.5 -34.9 26.7
31 29 28 30 29 29 28 25 25 22 30
97.63 118.20 136.59 140.97 149.72 151.91 626.03 145.78 134.84 126.52 182.99
21.1 15.6 3.2 6.2 1.5 312.1 -76.7 -7.5 -6.2 44.6
59 63 60 75 73 71 75 71 67 70 107
618.88 764.14 474.27 475.55 535.04 931.82 887.06 767.48 689.82 674.47 732.55
23.5 -37.9 0.3 12.5 74.2 -4.8 -13.5 -10.1 -2.2 8.6
168 164 182 192 185 198 197 192 202 212 272
11,421.48 13,764.73 14,481.24 15,226.32 15,517.40 14,687.94 15,726.26 11,671.86 11,634.04 12,268.45 12,871.05
20.5 5.2 5.1 1.9 -5.3 7.1 -25.8 -0.3 5.5 4.9
3234 3151 3221 3205 3048 3048 3044 2864 2917 2983 3643
Plant and equipment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
% change                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       














Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades and calculations by the authors. Departments selected to show those with higher stocks of plant and 
equipment. Peso values converted to 2005 pesos using the Producer Price Index (IPP) from the Central Bank of Colombia, and to USD at the 
2005 exchange rate. 
Taxes:
Table 4
 Colombia doesn’t fare well either in global business environment surveys with respect to 
the level of taxes or the efficiency of the tax system. The Colombian tax system is plagued with 
distortions that prevent competition on a level field and are hard to justify based on sound 
microeconomics (see Arbeláez et al, 2006), and with respect to the tax level, nominal corporate 
tax rates are misleading because firms face a number of different taxes that add up. 
In addition, and most detrimental to investment decisions, tax policy in Colombia is highly 
volatile. The difficulty to pass a structural tax reform through Congress, that is critical and 
pending, has resulted in the passing of subsequent tax bills introducing partial adjustments and 
new distortions to the tax system and repeatedly changing the rules of the game for private 
investors. To give an idea of the extent of rule instability  
 presents a calculation of the mean income tax rate paid by each sector and of its variation   16 
over time, after accounting for discounts and exemptions. These tax rates calculated over taxable 
income before exemptions
9
Table 4: Tax rates dispersion, 1997-2004*  
  applicable to the taxable base using firm-level data, reflect the 
dispersion in tax treatments as well as the effect of the changing regulations. 
 
ISIC 2-DIGIT SECTOR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean Standard 
Deviation
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 29.4 30.4 30.6 31.2 29.5 29.3 29.4 30.3 30.0 0.7
Fishing 27.5 28.5 25.7 26.3 25.8 26.9 26.2 27.8 26.8 1.0
Mining and quarrying 31.7 33.1 33.6 34.1 33.8 33.1 34.2 33.9 33.4 0.8
Manufacturing 29.7 30.5 31.3 32.2 32.2 32.6 32.6 33.0 31.8 1.2
Electricity, gas and water supply 18.8 14.3 16.8 19.9 21.6 22.6 29.7 30.5 21.8 5.8
Construction 31.5 32.6 32.5 32.4 32.8 33.0 32.5 32.6 32.5 0.4
Wholesale and retail trade 32.3 32.3 32.6 32.6 33.1 32.9 33.0 33.3 32.8 0.4
Hotels and restaurants 32.5 33.4 33.9 33.1 34.1 34.1 33.8 33.7 33.6 0.5
Transport, storage and communications 28.4 29.1 30.2 30.9 31.1 31.0 30.7 30.7 30.3 1.0
Financial intermediation 27.4 28.2 28.2 27.6 27.1 27.5 27.1 26.8 27.5 0.5
Real estate, renting and business activities 31.6 32.3 32.4 32.1 32.4 32.1 31.9 32.2 32.1 0.3
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 11.8 20.4 21.2 21.3 13.6 14.3 12.6 16.2 16.4 4.0
Education 19.8 22.3 22.3 20.6 19.7 19.0 18.8 19.5 20.3 1.4
Health and social work 24.1 24.5 25.2 24.2 24.7 24.1 23.0 23.7 24.2 0.7
Other community, social and personal service activities 21.9 20.7 20.4 20.8 19.3 18.9 19.2 19.2 20.0 1.0
Private households with employed persons 20.0 0.0 23.9 29.9 34.9 28.4 22.9 12.3
Mean 29.4 29.7 30.1 30.2 30.2 30.1 30.1 30.4
Standard Deviation 6.1 5.8 5.7 8.7 6.2 6.1 6.5 5.7
Nominal income tax rate 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 38.5 38.5 38.5  
Source: DIAN and calculations by the authors. *Net income tax/(Taxable income + Exemptions to taxable base). 
Another channel through which taxation may compromise investor returns in Colombia is 
through its effect on informality, which seems to have increased in the 1990s along with non-
salary labor costs (i.e. taxes on labor). Because competition with informal firms occurs at lower 
prices, rising informality implies competition at lower prices. This may drive investors to invest 
less than they would in its absence, because investments become less profitable or because, by 
remaining smaller, firms are able to also benefit from some degree of informality without being 
noticed by the tax authorities. 
 
Competition policy
While this is hard to illustrate based on objective data and would require more rigorous testing, 
the record of antitrust investigations by the competition authority in charge of overseeing the 
manufacturing sector
: Institutional weakness in the implementation of a competition policy to 
guarantee a level field for all investors has often resulted in expropriation of the smaller investors 
through the unfair competition and market monopolization by larger firms.   
10
                                                 
9 Exemptions are granted to particular sectors by Law and are in addition to the usual deductions that apply to the calculation of taxable income. 
10 SIC is in charge of overseeing the manufacturing sector and is also responsible of competition policy in all other sectors not explicitly assigned 
by law to other governmental authorities. 
, SIC, for the period between January 2000 and March 2007, combined 
with the complaint about the reduced plant capacity of its antitrust unit, makes at least wonder 
about this weakness. 40% of all demands attended over this period closed with no consequence 
to the accused due to ‘lack of merit’ for the accusation, and another 40% fell in the ‘guarantee’   17 
category, that as stated by the competition authorities themselves, is a mild way of reprimand 
often incapable of inducing a desired change of behavior  
While the situation is probably not worse now than it was in the 1970s, when Colombia did not 
have an applicable competition law11
iii.  Government failures – macro risks 
, and the lack of a strong competition authority cannot on 
its own be singled out as the most binding constraint for growth in Colombia, it still seems worth 
exploring further the extent to which the lack of this fundamental guarantee for market 
participation and the consequent increasing concentration of some markets in Colombia is a 
limitation for investment. 
Evaluation: uncertainty about the private appropriability of investment returns is one of the most 
binding constraints for economic growth in Colombia. Identification of the shape of the 
distortions to private investment from uncertainty about appropriability of returns is key for 
adequate policy design in the context of an on-going war, as well as for the assessment of the 
relative importance of this branch of the HRV (2005) decision tree in limiting economic growth 
in Colombia. 
While at the outset there is a temptation to say that competition policy, and changing taxation 
rules must not distort investment decisions as much as the poor protection of property rights 
connected to the armed conflict, it is still worth establishing their relative weight as sources of 
low appropriability in a more rigorous way. Particularly because these may be fronts over which 
policy makers can have a more direct impact in the short-run. 
Fiscal deficit has improved although there are still some concerns. Pension reforms and transfers 
to local entities reform have addressed some of the main risks for fiscal sustainability. Pension 
outlays, which still represent a big part of the expenditure budget each year, have been fully 
dimensioned and accounted for and are no longer a source of fiscal uncertainty. Publicly owned 
enterprises have as well gone through a process of reform, which includes privatization, resizing, 
and private partnership, among others. There is also a bet placed on the future performance of 
Ecopetrol, the national oil company that experts consider reasonable. 
Figure 15 shows the Ministry of Finance’s accounting of the fiscal deficit and its projection for 
2007. While the fiscal situation of Colombia has not always been easy and in the 1990s growing 
fiscal deficits accumulated resulting in an increasing accumulation of public debt that reached 
levels above 50% of GDP between 2001 and 2005, calculations of the primary surplus required 
to guarantee debt sustainability –stabilization at 50% of GDP– are of 2.38% of GDP, with the 
economy growing at an annual rate of 5% and an interest rate of 10% (Cárdenas, 2006). 
 
                                                 
11 See Arbeláez et al (2006).   18 







































































Decentralized (1) National Government (2)
 Fiscal Deficit (1+2)
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, CONFIS. (pr): preliminary; (py): projected. 
The Colombian government has indeed been successful at lowering its debt burden over the past 
few years. Recent performance of the primary surplus has been above the government’s targets 
and resulted in a lower public debt than originally expected. For the medium term, the Ministry 
of Finance expects a net public debt path systematically declining towards levels close to 23% of 
GDP in ten years.  
On the external side, Colombia’s vulnerabilities have followed the same trend. All indices of 
external sustainability have been systematically improving since 2000 and are expected to 
continue to improve. 
All this reflects in the way markets are reading Colombian macroeconomic performance 
However, there are still concerns. One of them, for the medium term, is that Colombia’s public 
debt is still above investment grade emerging market economies public debt. 
For the short term, although government consumption as a share of GDP has been declining, and 
is currently about 5 points below the peak it reached during 1999-2000, there are signs of 
overheating pressures that have translated into a higher inflation and a widening of the current 
account deficit. To address short and medium term issues the government could reduce even 
further its expenditures. 
Evaluation: macro risks are not a binding constraint for growth in Colombia.  
iv.  Market failures 
Information and coordination failures: Colombian exports have experienced sustained growth 
since 1970, and have been particularly dynamic since the late 1980s. So based on the evolution 
of exports over time it is hard to argue that information or coordination failures have resulted in 
low investment due to poor entrepreneurship in Colombia. Exports per capita grew at an average 
rate of 15.5% in the 1970s when the economy was growing and despite periods of deceleration   19 
almost tripled between 1990 and 2005 (see Figure 6). Also, and most importantly, for analyzing 
whether lack of self-discovery is the most binding constraint for growth in Colombia, export 
dynamism has been accompanied by substantial diversification. 
 
















































































Oil and oil products Non traditional
 
Source: DANE, Banco de la República and calculations by the authors.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates the re-composition of the Colombian export basket in response to the decline 
in coffee exports since 1986. While overall export growth was not enough to result in sustained 
growth of exports as a share of GDP -exports as a share of GDP are currently at the 1990 level- 




 grew as a ratio of traditional exports (coffee, oil and oil 
products, carbon and ferronickel) from 0.4 in 1986 to 1 in 2005. 
 
                                                 
12 Local jargon for export products different to coffee, oil and minerals.   20 















































































Coffee Carbon Oil and oil products Ferronickel Non traditional  
Source: DANE and calculations by the authors. 
Average annual growth of non-traditional exports between 1970 and 2005 not only was 5.3 times 
higher than overall average annual export growth, but also was characterized by increasing 
exports of manufactures of medium and high knowledge content
13
This is confirmed by the measure of export sophistication, EXPY, proposed by Hausmann, 
Hwang and Rodrik (2006)
. The share of technology-
based exports increased from 20% of total exports to 26%, between 1994 and 2004, driven by the 
dynamics of medium technology products.. 
14
Despite all of the above, it is also true that Colombian exports lag both in dynamism and size 
when compared to other Latin American countries and are small also relative to Colombia’s 
economy size (see Hausmann and Klinger, 2007). So while self-discovery cannot be singled out 
as a binding constraint for growth there is still the question of whether export growth and 
, according to which the level of Colombia’s current export basket 
sophistication appears as moderate but increasing overtime. In fact compared to other Latin 
American countries Colombia’s exports basket looks well by this sophistication measure when 
considered against GDP per capita. Export sophistication progress overtime has been extremely 
dynamic, much more than the Latin American average and, moreover, that Colombia has been 
closing the gap in export sophistication systematically since 1975. 
Finally, global business environment surveys also capture the view that Colombian entrepreneurs 
have been relatively good at moving towards more sophisticated production (and export) baskets. 
With respect to business sophistication Colombia was ranked in place 48 among 125 countries in 
the Global Competitiveness Report of 2006-07. With respect to innovation, it was ranked in 
place 57.  
                                                 
13 Sector categorization by knowledge content is based on a set of research and development and human capital sector-level indices developed by 
DANE as a guide to determine the evolution of Colombian manufacturing towards knowledge intensive production technologies. 
14 The authors develop a measure of revealed sophistication of each product, PRODY, as the revealed comparative advantage weighted GDP per 
capita of each country that exports the good. This is a measure of the GDP per capita of the typical country that exports good i. It is a measure of 
sophistication inferred from the types of countries exporting a good. This product-level measure can then be used to measure the sophistication of 
a country’s entire export basket, EXPY, the income level associated with a country’s export package.   21 
increasing export sophistication could be critical to move the economy onto a higher growth path 
in the future. 
Colombia’s shift towards manufacturing exports has been slower than the Latin American 
average and the fact that fuels still represent a significant share of all exports implies that the 
Colombian economy is significantly exposed to world prices volatility.  
Colombia is nonetheless in a potentially good position for improvement according to Hausmann 
and Klinger (2006)’s open forest measure
15
c.  Low return to economic activity - low social returns 
. While it is not in a particularly dense or sparse part 
of the product space, its open forest has been steadily increasing in value over time. Hausmann 
and Klinger (2007) show that since 1985 Colombia has “caught up with Argentina, closed the 
gap with Brazil and kept the pace with Mexico” 
This continuously improving open forest tells that Colombia has persistently succeeded in 
choosing to produce and export goods with good strategic value. So despite its relatively poor 
export performance, the country is now facing an expanding option set that places it in a good 
position to achieve an export-led structural transformation. 
Evaluation: Market failures resulting in low self-discovery are not the most binding constraint 
for growth in Colombia.  
i.  Poor geography  / Bad infrastructure 
Despite having wide coasts, both on the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, Colombia’s geography 
is challenging for economic growth and development. In particular, most productive activities 
have been historically concentrated in the country’s interior on top of the Andean mountain 
range to a large extent land-locked due to bottlenecks in the transport infrastructure connecting 
the main production and consumption centers between each other and to the ports. Transport 
costs are, in consequence, a key issue affecting competitiveness of the Colombian products in the 
foreign markets. They are also one of the reasons why expansion across both the local markets 
and abroad has only been possible for the larger producers.  
Table 5 presents an overview of the evolution of road and railroad transport infrastructure since 
1991. Progress in terms of kilometers covered is of 19% and 35% between 1991 and 2005 
respectively. In the case of railways increase reflects exclusively the repair of the existent 
railroad network that had been abandoned.  
                                                 
15 This is a measure of the degree to which the country’s current export basket is connected with valuable new productive possibilities 
representing opportunities for structural transformation. It is found by these authors to be highly significant in determining the future growth of 
export sophistication of a country.   22 
 
Table 5: Colombia: Land transport Infrastructure, 1991-2005 
Km
Km / 1000 
inhabitants
Km
Km / 1000 
inhabitants
1991 161,249 4.52 1,578 0.044 -
1992 161,274 4.43 1,578 0.043 508
1993 161,185 4.34 1,578 0.043 -
1994 161,205 4.26 2,097 0.055 434
1995 161,334 4.19 2,100 0.054 426
1996 161,574 4.11 1,920 0.049 419
1997 161,574 4.03 2,060 0.051 -
1998 161,532 3.96 2,027 0.050 -
1999 162,574 3.91 1,983 0.048
2000 163,537 3.86 1,973 0.047 489
2001 163,541 3.80 2,228 0.052 520
2002 163,546 3.73 2,212 0.050 564
2003 163,635 3.67 2,231 0.050 580
2004 164,184 3.62 2,137 0.047 614




Source: Ministry of Transportation of Colombia. 
 
When compared against other Latin American countries in terms of kilometers per capita, 
Colombia does not fare well. This, however, may not be the best measure to evaluate Colombia’s 
transport infrastructure, because given the country’s geography there is little space for more 
expansion and the concern is more about quality. This is true particularly regarding the National 
road network connecting the interior with the ports and the large productive centers between 
each other that nowadays connects all regions with a minimum population density, stopping 
where expansion becomes cost-ineffective due to a combination of complex geography – there is 
not only the Andean Mountain range, but also the tropical forests in Urabá and Amazonia – and 
low population. 
Perhaps a better measure of overall road infrastructure development is the proportion of paved 
roads.  
Table 6 presents road quality information available for the National road network. It shows road 
expansion proportionately more concentrated on unpaved roads and negligible progress in paved 
road quality since 1998. Both things contribute to bottlenecks that translate into transport costs.  
 
Table 6: National road network 
Km % Km % Km % Km % Km % Km %
1998 10,388         2,931         13,319       8,103     78 1,766     17 519        5 1,348     46 938        32 645        22
1999 11,010         3,549         14,559       7,597     69 2,312     21 1,101     10 674        19 1,597     45 1,278     36
2000 11,732         4,790         16,522       7,978     68 2,816     24 939        8 2,156     45 1,868     39 766        16
2001 11,744         4,791         16,535       8,221     70 2,701     23 822        7 1,629     34 2,012     42 1,150     24
2002 11,921         4,607         16,528       8,225     69 2,623     22 1,073     9 1,889     41 1,520     33 1,198     26
2003 12,154         4,493         16,647       8,022     66 3,160     26 972        8 1,887     42 1,573     35 1,033     23
2004 12,170         4,471         16,641       8,276     68 3,043     25 852        7 1,967     44 1,654     37 849        19
Paved Unpaved
Good Medium Bad Good Medium Bad Year Paved Unpaved Total
 
Source: INVIAS 
   23 
Table 7 gives a rough idea of the dispersion of transport costs across regions that in turn reflect 
road infrastructure quality and/or geographic complexity
16





Armenia 86 169 98 81
Barranquilla 90 273 263
Bogotá 64 114 57 67
Bucaramanga 103 110 96 108
Buenaventura 93 102 87
Cali 82 213 91 81
Cartagena 232 108 154
Manizales 92 145 98 84
Medellín 74 108 91 70
Pereira 87 162 97 83
Santa Marta 298 83 154
Average 121 130 116 108
Barranquilla Buenaventura Cartagena Santa Marta
 
Source: Ministry of Transportation of Colombia and calculations by the authors. 
 
Transport infrastructure is much better nowadays however than it was before 1990, and quality 
improvements under concession contracts are noteworthy. So on the grounds of comparison with 
the situation in the 1970s alone, it is hard to sustain that transport infrastructure development is a 
binding constraint to growth. But the truth is that the context of globalization is very different to 
that of the 1970s, and if Colombia is to take advantage of the growth opportunities from 
increasing international trade, dealing with the challenges posed by the country’s geography with 
solutions that translate into lower transport costs will be crucial for future investment and 
growth. 
An issue that should be raised under this literal is whether it makes sense to stand back and 
reconsider the geographic development pattern of the Colombian economy to better understand 
what has driven businesses to locate far away from ports in areas landlocked by the mountain 
range and dependent on the development of costly infrastructure for access to external markets. 
Inducing more efficient location patterns may be in the hands of policy makers through the 
provision of the appropriate incentives and may be more cost-effective in the long run. This 
policy route will be furthered considered. 
Other infrastructure sectors are less problematic. They experienced substantial improvements 
during the 1990s, after the Constitution of 1991 gave way to the participation of the private 
sector in their provision. In the case of electric energy, while prices increased in the 1990s due to 
rebalancing to more appropriately reflect costs, service quality improvement was also 
considerable relative to previous decades. In the case of communications, opening the sector to 
                                                 
16 The history of transport costs in this shape is being reconstructed since 1997 from information available through the Ministry of Transport of 
Colombia.    24 
competition has translated into immense progress in service penetration and in many cases lower 
prices.  
Evaluation: While geography in itself is not a growth constraint that can be dealt with directly, 
exploring the alternative policy routes to deal with the challenges it poses to economic growth in 
Colombia in a context of increasing globalization is critical. Remaining bottlenecks in the road 
network translate into high transport costs by international standards and affect the ability of 
Colombian producers to compete in international markets. Transport costs are, in consequence, a 
binding constraint to growth in Colombia. 
It is worthwhile to consider if investment priorities for the improvement of transport 
infrastructure can be rationalized by pairing the governments’ efforts in this direction with 
alternative policies connected to rethinking the country’s spatial development pattern.   
ii.  Low human capital 
Patrinos et al. (2006) estimate the benefits of education and their distribution across education 
levels and income distribution for a set of East Asian and Latin American countries, including 
Colombia. Their empirical evidence suggests that Colombia has both a relatively high 
educational attainment level and a relatively low constraint of human capital supply. 
According to their cross-country data survey, Colombia stands well above the Latin-American 
mean in terms of schooling attainment. First, while in Colombia the average years of schooling 
of male wage earners between 25 and 65 years old was 10.5, the average for Latin-America was 
9. Second, the fraction of this population (wage earners 25 to 65 years old) with tertiary 
education is high in Colombia (20.3%) with respect to the Latin-American average (13.3%). 
Colombia also fares well by average years of schooling compared to the mean of the East Asian 
countries considered in the analysis  (9.8 years) and is below but close to the average by the 
second measure. 
With respect to returns to schooling, while in the aggregate estimates place Colombia just below 
the Latin-American average of 11.6%, estimating returns to schooling by education level 
Patrinos et al (2006) find that returns to higher technical and university education in Colombia 
are quite low compared to other Latin-American countries. 
Returns to schooling estimations by Prada (2006) for four cross-sections of the Colombian 
National Household Survey yield results comparable to Patrinos et al (2006) and show that 
returns to education in Colombia have increased for additional years of secondary education, but 
display a decreasing tendency when it comes to higher education levels. Both Patrinos et al 
(2006) and Prada (2006) find no shortage of qualified labor supply in Colombia. 
As a complement to the evidence from these papers, in the more recent Global Competitiveness 
Report, in Colombia is rated well compared to other Latin American countries with regards to 
the quality of its higher education and training, and ranked 69 among 125 countries by this 
measure. This rating is also consistent with the findings of a survey of 61 foreign investors 
established in Colombia undertaken on behalf of UNCTAD by Fedesarrollo in 2003 in which 
foreign companies rate well the Colombian labor force skills, both at the executive and technical 
levels.   25 
Evaluation:  Low human capital is not the most binding constraint for economic growth in 
Colombia. 
4.  Microeconomic assessment 
The growth diagnostics exercise of the previous section permits to discard some of the potential 
sources of constraints to private investment in a straightforward manner, but is inconclusive with 
regards to the relative weight of the branches that are left standing: micro-risks due to 
government failures resulting in poor appropriability of investment returns, low returns from 
poor geography and lacking transport infrastructure, and poor access to financing due to bad 
local finance. This section goes further in exploring how these variables affect investor decisions 
and weight relative to each other as determinants of investment and growth.  
Using firm-level capital expenditures data, the relative importance of these variables is tested in 
an econometric setting. Analysis rests on the estimation of two types of models: a probit model 
to explain the investment decision, and two Tobit regressions to explain the level of capital 
expenditures in the case of firms that choose to invest. 
 
a.  Data 
The primary database used in estimation is a firm-level panel shaped dataset containing financial 
statements of all firms with income or assets at or above 20,000 minimum wages each year in 
Colombia, available from Superintendencia de Sociedades from 1995 to 2005. Superintendencia 
de Sociedades granted access to annexes to these financial statements containing additional firm 
characteristics that are not publicly available, among them detailed data about firm fixed assets. 
A significant amount of time was devoted to link each observation to the municipality where the 
firm actually operates, since firms are often registered in the major urban centers and not 
necessarily where they are located. Accomplishing this task required crossing the database with a 
firm directory made available by the National Statistics Department (DANE) and with other 
sources of information available and eventually, in the case of multi-plant firms, directly 
contacting firm headquarters.  
Capital expenditures were defined as positive changes in the values of plant and equipment, 
converted to 2005 pesos using the Producer Price Index from the Central Bank of Colombia.  
The Ministry of Finance tax administration, DIAN, provided firm level tax data that was used to 
calculate effectively paid income tax rates. Because firm-level tax data fall under a statistical 
reserve regulation that prevents it from being made public, firm identification numbers were 
coded and effective tax rates had to be constructed as ISIC 4-digit sector averages (a summary of 
this information is presented in Table 4).  
The Observatory of Human Rights from the Vice-Presidency of Colombia provided 
municipality-level violence data by actor for the period 1998-2005. 
Regulated transport costs for 16 municipalities that include the larger urban centers, for 1998 to 
2005, were recovered from Ministry of Transport’s resolutions. Costs per ton per kilometer 
traveled were calculated from each municipality to each of the four larger Colombian ports -
Cartagena, Buenaventura, Santa Marta and Barranquilla- and each municipality was assigned the   26 
cost corresponding to the cheaper route connecting it to the international markets. Regretfully 
there is no systematic information available about transport costs between the main cities. 
Finally, exports and imports data by ISIC 4-digit sector as well as department-level GDP data 
were available from the National Statistics Department, DANE, and interest rates were available 
from the IFS. 
Most of these data were used in the previous section to provide support for the analyses 
presented.  
 
b.  Econometric exercises 
i.  Investment decision 
Investment decisions at the microeconomic level are examined using a Probit model to estimate 
the probability of observing positive capital expenditures. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to one at time t if the firm reports a positive change in plant and equipment with 
respect to the previous period, and zero otherwise.  
Explanatory variables are proxies of the potential constraints to growth identified in Section 3. 
Three sources of poor appropiability due to weak property rights are examined in estimation. 
Uncertainty from the violent conflict is captured through two municipality-level variables: the 
number of violent events at time t and a proxy of public order restored defined as a dummy equal 
to 1 at time t if at time (t-1) there was paramilitary violence reported in the municipality and at 
time t there is none. The first of these measures is straightforward and the expected coefficient 
on it is negative. The second one requires a more careful explanation. It is known that 
paramilitary presence has often contributed to restoration of public order in regions where it had 
been previously challenged by guerrilla violence and that violence is typically a concern in 
regions under dispute but moderates when one of the sides in conflict gains a dominant position. 
So reduced paramilitary violence may be reflecting this kind of situation. Alternatively it may be 
reflecting the effectiveness of governmental intervention to contain the conflict. Since insurance 
availability that can be key to the viability of large-scale investments is importantly determined 
by public order conditions, a positive correlation is expected between firm-level investment 
decisions and restoration of some form of public order.  
Uncertainty from changing tax rules is captured by the standard deviation over time of the 
effectively paid ISIC 4-digit sector tax rate. The expected coefficient on this variable is negative, 
since larger variability in tax rules should induce increased uncertainty about investment returns.  
The ISIC 4-digit Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) of market concentration was used to capture 
uncertainty from expropriation by exposure to abuse of dominant position by other market 
players or predatory pricing. Presumably in more concentrated markets exercise of market power 
is more pervasive and can result in monopolizing behaviors that deter investments through the 
threat of expropriation, in absence of a strong competition authority. If this is the case, the 
coefficient on this variable should be negative. If, however, investors in relatively concentrated 
markets are at an advantage, and concentration results from economies of scale or puts investors   27 
in a position to extract larger monopoly rents, the coefficient on this variable should be positive. 
The sign depends on which effect dominates
17
Finally, since firm-level investment decisions are likely to vary across firms sizes and are 
expected to be positively correlated to macroeconomic performance, firm size in the previous 
period (the log of firm operational income at time (t-1) deflated using the Producer Price Index) 
and previous period GDP growth of the Department where the firm is located are included as 
controls. This variable is chosen as macroeconomic control in exchange of time dummies. Since 
time dummies take away the significance of explanatory variables that vary more over time than 
across firms, and by construction the measures used to assess the impact of the armed conflict 
and of poor transport infrastructure vary across groups of firms (in the same municipality or the 
same department) but are not firm or sector specific, and there is a particular interest in learning 
how these variables affect firm investment choices, the model specification using time dummies 
as controls is not used in the analysis
. 
To assess if high financing costs are indeed a constraint to investment in Colombia, the one 
period lag of the lending interest rate multiplied by a firm measure of financial indebtedness 
(financial liabilities over total liabilities) is included among the explanatory variables. A negative 
coefficient on this variable will signal that access to financing is a problem. 
The impact of low profitability due to high transport costs is examined through the inclusion of a 
proxy of the transport costs to the closest major port faced by the firm, constructed as described 
in the previous section. Because transport costs per ton per kilometer tend to be higher from 
locations in the countries interior where economic activity and investment tend to concentrate, 
this variable is treated as endogenous to investment decisions and is instrumented in estimation 
using measures of agglomeration such as number of firms and aggregate operational income of 
firms in the municipality as instruments. Since investment decisions of firms that import or 
export more are likely to be affected by higher transport costs to the ports than firms whose 
activity is restricted to the local markets, this variable enters estimation multiplied by an ISIC 4-
digit measure of international exposure equal to imports plus exports divided by 2. It enters 
estimation in logarithmic form. 
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ii.  Investment level decision 
.  
Standard errors are robust and clustered by ISIC 4-digit sector. 
While both decisions occur simultaneously in practice, deciding whether or not to make an 
investment at a given time is different than deciding on what to invest and how much. The 
drivers behind both decisions are not necessarily the same. For instance, factors that cause 
uncertainty are, at least conceptually, more associated to the timing of investment than to its 
magnitude (see Dixit and Pyndick, 1994). 
                                                 
17 Alternatively, an ISIC 4-digit sector dummy equal to 1 if the sector was ever questioned by the competition authority with regards to the 
occurrence of monopolizing behaviors and equal to 0 otherwise was used to capture this type of uncertainty. It turned out to be not significant 
under standard errors adjusted for sector clusters. This variable was constructed thanks to access to the Competition Policy Unit files at 
Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio. 
18 Results for model specifications including time dummies are available from the authors on request.   28 
A second econometric model explores the decision of how much to invest. Since the purpose of 
this exercise still is to explore the impact of the growth constraints identified in Section 3 on 
investment, the set of explanatory variables is largely the same as before. To explore positive 
investment decisions, negative entries resulting from actual disinvestment or from accounting 
practices are set equal to zero. Estimation is done using two alternative Tobit models: a fixed 
effects Tobit regression and an instrumental variables Tobit regression. Through inclusion of 
firm fixed-effects, the former of these regressions prevents biases and potential endogeneities 
arising from unobserved firm variables without variation over time, and also recognizes the fact 
that investment projects are firm-specific and that while investment decisions may be facilitated 
or hindered by the environment in which a firm operates, the magnitude of the investment to 
undertake  will largely depend on specificities of each investment project. Conceptually this 
model seems the more adequate for the purpose of this study. It does not, however, control for 
biases due to the endogeneity of variables that change over time. For this reason, the transport 
costs proxy is excluded from estimation. The second regression includes transport costs. 
 
c.  Estimation 
i.  Investment decision 
Estimation results for the investment decision probit model are presented in Table 8. To check 
the results’ robustness to more stringent definitions of positive investment, the dependent 
variable is redefined to take the value of 1 only for investment rates in excess of 10%, and only 
for investment rates in excess of 20%.  
In the first model, where any positive capital expenditure is taken to be a decision to invest, most 
variables are significant and have the expected signs on their coefficients. The exceptions are the 
market concentration measure and the transport costs proxy that are not significant and judging 
from these results apparently do not affect investment decisions in Colombia. Marginal effects 
(dy/dx) reported are for y equal to the probability of a positive outcome. When the explanatory 
variable is a dummy variable, dy/dx is for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
Marginal effects of all variables become smaller as the investment definition is made more 
stringent and some variables lose significance. In the cases of the 10% and 20% investment rate 
thresholds, the tax rate variation measure becomes insignificant and so does the measure of 
public order restored. These results leave two sources of constraints to investment standing: poor 
appropriability of investment returns due to the ongoing armed conflict and poor access to 
financing.  
As expected, size matters. Larger firms have a higher probability to invest than others. This 
result is robust for the first two investment definitions. Marginal effects of firm size are 
comparable in size across models. 
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Table 8: Investment decision 
Coefficient dy/dx Coefficient dy/dx Coefficient dy/dx
Transport Costs * ISIC 4-digit sector 
international exposure
1 0.010 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001
(0.023) (0.016) (0.019)
Size(t-1) 0.049 0.018 0.063 0.019 0.037 0.009
(0.029)* (0.022)*** (0.025)
ISIC 4-digit Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 0.075 0.028 0.053 0.016 -0.009 -0.002
(0.092) (0.089) (0.089)
ISIC 4-digit sector effective income tax rate 
standard deviation -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002
(0.006)* (0.008) (0.008)
Violent Events -0.051 -0.019 -0.049 -0.015 -0.041 -0.010
(0.02)** (0.019)** (0.021)**
Dummy public order restored 0.179 0.069 0.063 0.020 0.021 0.005
(0.062)*** (0.072) (0.069)
Department-level real  GDP growth (t-1) 0.021 0.008 0.014 0.004 0.011 0.003
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Lending rate (t-1) * Financial debt (t-1) -0.008 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)**
Constant -1.130 -1.650 -1.487
(0.329)*** (0.284)*** (0.298)
Number of observations 13,160 13,160 13,163
Log seudolikelihood -57,878 -56,408 -55,304
Wald chi
2 (8) 130.26 90.60 45.94
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if firm 
reports positive capital expenditures
IV Probit Regressions
Investment rate > 20%
1 Instrumented. Instruments:  Firm size(t-1), ISIC 4-digit sector HHI, ISIC 4-digit sector effective tax rate standard deviation, Violent 
events, Dummy public order restored,  Lending rate(t-1)*Financial debt(t-1), Real Department GDP growth, Number of firms in 
municipality, Income of firms in municipality, Exchange rate
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
ISIC 4-digit sector clusters.
 Investment rate > 10% Investment rate > 0
 
Source: calculations by the authors. 
ii.  Investment level decision 
Table 9 presents the results of the Tobit regressions exploring the extent to which the growth 
constraints identified in Section 3 determine the size of the investments firms undertake, when 
they decide to invest.  
Results from the fixed-effects Tobit regression say that, after controlling for firm specific 
characteristics, size remains a significant variable in explaining investment levels: larger firms 
incur larger investments, as is to be expected. It also says that violence results in lower 
investment levels and so do financial constraints. These results are in agreement with those 
obtained in the models intended to explain investment choice and underscore the role of both   30 
uncertainty about property rights arising from the ongoing armed-conflict and poor access to 
financing as constraints for private investment in Colombia.  
 
Table 9 – Extent of investment decision 
Coefficient Coefficient





ISIC 4-digit Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 1.372 1.249
(0.624)** (1.188)
ISIC 4-digit sector effective income tax rate 
standard deviation -0.123
(0.076)
Violent Events -0.694 -0.682
(0.14)*** (0.248)***
Dummy public order restored 1.398 2.012
(0.428)*** (0.727)***
Department-level real  GDP growth (t-1) 0.255 0.270
(0.025)*** (0.04)***




Number of observations 18,412 13,160
Log seudolikelihood -73,866






Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ISIC 4-digit sector clusters.
Firm fixed effects Instrumental variables 
regression
Tobit Regressions
1 Instrumented. Instruments: Firm size(t-1), ISIC 4-digit sector HHI, ISIC 4-digit sector effective tax
rate standard deviation, Violent events, Dummy public order restored, Lending rate(t-1)*Financial
debt(t-1), Real Department GDP growth, Number of firms in municipality, Income of firms in
municipality, Exchange rate
Dependent variable: Log (change in capital 
expenditures). Made = 0 if entry < 0.
 
Source: calculations by the authors. 
 
Estimation including firm fixed-effects also yields a significant positive coefficient on the 
dummy variable indicating restoration of public order. According to this result, higher 
investments are also associated to locations in which distress from paramilitary violence is no 
longer present. Recall recent economic growth in Colombia coincides in time with peace 
agreements between the government and the paramilitary.   31 
Finally, there is a positive  and significant coefficient on the market concentration measure 
indicating that firms in more concentrated sectors tend to incur larger investments. Both, market 
concentration and larger scale investments are probably associated to operation under scale 
economies. 
Tax uncertainty and transport costs are unaccounted for in this version of the model. They are 
however included in the instrumental variables Tobit regression and both rendered not 
significant. With the exception of the result on the market concentration measure, all other 
findings of the fixed-effects panel regression are confirmed by this model specification. 
5.  Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
Colombia is growing and appears to finally be on a path of recovery from the slowdown of the 
end of the century. In this context it is hard to talk about binding constraints to growth, because 
no constraint has apparently been binding in recent years. There is, however, a structural change 
in the way the armed conflict has evolved that can partially explain the economy’s positive 
performance since 2003. This research adds little new insight in recognizing the critical role of 
the conflict in connection to economic activity. It advances, however, in identifying the channels 
through which this effect materializes and in giving an order of magnitude to the costs it 
represents through its negative impact on private investment. 
Issues about geographically widespread growth and sustainability were raised. Examination of 
regional growth considering the conflict’s geographical distribution showed economic 
reactivation in areas with falling violence. This is not surprising. Nonetheless, results from 
analysis at a microeconomic level give this conclusion a particular spin by showing that 
investment decisions at the firm level are also affected by the restoration of some form of public 
order connected to the cessation of paramilitary violence and not only by the reduction of 
violence per se. This could be reflecting the critical role played by insurance markets, since 
insurance availability depends on the insurance sector perceptions of public order. 
While measures used to assess the impact of tax rule instability on investment decisions are 
imperfect, there is empirical evidence that changing tax rules apparently affect the probability of 
investment through their impact on firm expectations and the uncertainty they bring about future 
returns. 
Measures of market concentration were used to capture the potential effects of uncertainty on 
investment returns from risk of monopolizing behaviors. It turned out that, if anything, 
investment decisions are facilitated by market concentration, possibly because firms enabled to 
exploit scale economies or to extract rents through the exercise of some degree of market power 
face less uncertainty about their ability to recover their investments and are therefore more likely 
to invest. In practice, this should be balanced by the intervention of the competition authority to 
make sure it does not occur at the expense of consumers and/or of smaller investors. 
Among the sources of poor appropriability from micro-risks due to government failures 
identified in the growth diagnostics exercise, only the variables associated to the conflict survive 
across all model specifications when their impact on investment decisions at the firm level is 
tested. The data confirm that this is unquestionably one of the most binding constraints for 
investment and that any effort directed towards ending violence and reestablishing public order   32 
will see a reward in economic reactivation. A note of caution is in order, however, since as 
discussed above, restoration of public order that occurs under the rule of paramilitary groups 
may as well provide the security conditions to facilitate investment. The country should decide if 
this is a desirable or necessary arrangement in the process of putting an end to the conflict and 
entering into a sustainable growth path. 
There is no evidence that transport costs affect firm investment decisions negatively. This result 
may due to the lack of firm specific data. The impact estimated is, however, not significant and 
while efforts towards lowering transport costs can only have positive impacts on economic 
activity, high transport costs cannot be singled out as the most important constraint affecting 
investment decisions in Colombia. 
Finally, from a public policy perspective, the most relevant result is the confirmation that in 
Colombia investment decisions are negatively affected by the costs of financing. Empirical 
results, robust across model specifications, single out the provision of access to financing at fair 
prices as a policy priority for economic growth, relevant across country regions and independent 
of whether uncertainties about appropriability issues are resolved.   33 
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